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Abstract: 
Commentators and practitioners increasingly emphasise that redressing violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) and improving the living conditions of 
individuals and communities is key in countries emerging from armed conflicts and 
widespread human rights abuses. Yet, it remains difficult to achieve this objective in practice 
and it is not obvious how international law can contribute to the enhancement of ESCR in the 
aftermath of pervasive abuses. This article addresses some of the subject’s conceptual and 
practical complexities: Based on an analysis of all relevant concluding observations, the 
article traces the evolution of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
jurisprudence on armed conflict. It then uses this analysis to highlight specific ways in which 
the reporting procedure before this supervisory body could be used more effectively to 
address ESCR problems related to armed conflicts, including by forging synergies with 
transitional justice mechanisms and broader post-conflict recovery policies. 
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[start of p.242] 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Attempts to strengthen the protection of human rights during or in the aftermath of armed 
conflicts or situations of widespread violence inherently face daunting challenges. Not 
uncommonly, these challenges pertain to people’s enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights (ESCR). In Timor Leste, to mention just one example, the Truth Commission 
concluded that the parties to the conflict damaged 77 per cent of health facilities. Virtually all 
of the country’s medical equipment and medicine was looted or destroyed. In 1999, ‘hundreds 
of thousands of people were rounded up (...) and herded like cattle from their homes or places 
of shelter onto trucks and boats bound for West Timor’.1 Not surprisingly, addressing the 
economic and social dimensions of such scenarios can be a core concern of the population 
most directly affected by the past conflict. 
Traditionally, responses to the legacies of armed conflicts and widespread violence 
have, however, tended to focus on a narrow set of civil and political rights. It is only in recent 
years that consideration of ESCR has started to gain prominence in debates on post-conflict 
human rights work, including transitional justice, which is defined as the full range of 
processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy 
of large-scale past abuses.
2
 Links between ESCR, development and post-conflict measures 
have increasingly been made in the literature.
3
 Louise Arbour, former High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, expressed the conviction that by paying increased attention to redressing 
ESCR violations, transitional justice ‘is poised to make the significant leap that would allow 
justice, in its full sense, to make the contribution that it should to societies in transition’.4 In 
2008, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights commissioned a study for 
Professor Christine Chinkin to provide an overview of the guarantees of ESCR in post-
                                               
1 Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, Chega! Final Report (CAVR 2005) 140-
6. 
2 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616, para 8. 
3 See for instance P de Greiff and R Duthie, Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections (Social 
Science Research Council 2009). See also the special issue of the International Journal of Transitional Justice in 
December 2008. For an overview, see the editorial: R Mani, ‘Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or 
Forging the Nexus between Transitional Justice and Development’ (2008) 2 International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 253. 
4 L Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’ (2007) 40 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 1, 2. 
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conflict situations.
5
 In this study, Professor Chinkin emphasises how the failure to strengthen 
the protection of ESCR ‘undermines the sought-after stability and human security post-
conflict (including food, health, gender and physical security), which in turn lessens the 
ability or willingness of victims and witnesses to participate in [start of p.243] the formal 
processes of post-conflict justice’.6 In particular, commentators point out that addressing the 
conflict-related issues pertaining to people’s enjoyment of ESCR is often a core interest of 
those most directly affected by the past conflict. As Antoine Buyse posits, problems related to 
housing restitution and displacement, for instance, are ‘often one of people’s main economic, 
material and also psychological concerns’ and moreover affect not only a few, but often a 
large proportion of the population in post-conflict countries.
7
 The relative neglect of ESCR 
could fail many victims, and moreover seems difficult to reconcile with the recognition of the 
interrelation and indivisibility between civil and political rights and ESCR.
8
 In his first report, 
the new Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of 
non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, stressed that ‘there is (…) great pressure also coming from 
the field to demonstrate the effectiveness of [measures taken in the aftermath of widespread 
abuses] both in redressing violations of economic, social and cultural rights and making 
contributions to improving the living conditions of individuals and communities previously 
affected by gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law’.9 Yet, despite increasing attention being paid to the issue in the literature 
and in the work of a handful of truth commissions,
10
 the legal framework of contemporary 
international human rights law on ESCR remains weakly integrated into efforts to strengthen 
the human rights protection in post-conflict countries.
11
 The report of the Liberian Truth and 
                                               
5 C Chinkin, ‘The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Post Conflict’ (OHCHR 2008) 
<www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf> accessed 8 July  2013. 
6 ibid 4. 
7 A Buyse, ‘Home Sweet Home? Restitution in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2009) 27 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 9, 10. S Leckie and C Huggins, Conflict and Housing, Land and Property Rights: A 
Handbook on Issues, Frameworks, and Solutions (CUP 2011). S Parmentier, M Valiñas and E Weitekamp, ‘How 
to Repair the Harm after Violent Conflict in Bosnia? Results of a Population-Based Survey’ (2009) 27 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 27, 36-37, reporting that 81% of respondents in a survey emphasised the 
issue of housing and property restitution. 
8 For instance, LJ Laplante, ‘On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the Right to 
Development’ (2007) 10 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 141. Citing the work of P Uvin, 
Human Rights and Development (Kumarian Press 2004) 39.  
9 UNHCR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of 
Non-Recurrence' (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/21/46, para 50. 
10 Notable examples of truth commissions that included considerations of ESCR in their analysis include the 
commissions of East Timor, Sierra Leone, Morocco, Guatemala and Peru. 
11 For the most recent overviews of the relative lack of attention paid to ESCR, see D Sharp, ‘Addressing 
Economic Violence in Times of Transition’ (2012) 35 Fordham International Law Journal 780, 782. See also L 
Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs’ (2012) 21 Social and Legal 
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Reconciliation Commission provides a striking example. The report opens with the 
Commission’s finding that poverty, inequality and unequal access to education or land tenure 
figured most prominently among the root causes of the long civil war.
12
 Yet, the legal [start of 
p.244] analysis of the final report barely touches upon ESCR at all, with the Commission 
simply stating that the references in its mandate to ‘violations of international human rights 
standards’ and ‘violations of international humanitarian law’ would somehow imply that the 
TRC Act was ‘almost exclusively concerned with gross violations of civil and political rights 
as opposed to economic, social and cultural rights’.13 Similarly, external experts and 
organisations advising national stakeholders on transitional justice issues tend to simply 
delegate ESCR issues to development agencies despite the well known limitation that 
‘development and economic growth do not necessarily translate into improved living 
conditions for specific groups or the realization of their human rights unless specific measures 
are taken to that end’.14 As a consequence of the still widespread assumptions on the lesser 
normative quality or importance of ESCR in international law, mainstream transitional justice 
approaches relegate socio-economic or cultural issues to the background as if ESCR abuses 
are significant only for the context they provide to other conflict-related human rights 
problems.
15
 Those who continue to believe that international law has nothing or very little to 
say about the protection of ESCR in general will, quite naturally, tend to assume that recourse 
to existing human rights law is unlikely to contribute to addressing the socio-economic and 
cultural issues that so prominently trouble many post-conflict societies.
16
 This unfortunate 
state of affairs can, however, be at least partially remedied by drawing attention to the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Studies 171, in particular at 173-4 for a (controversial) attempt to explain and possibly justify this relative 
neglect of ESCR. 
12 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Liberia (TRC): Volume I: Findings and Determinations (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia 2008). 
See further E Schmid, ‘Liberia’s Truth Commission Report: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
Transitional Justice’ (2009) 24 PRAXIS - The Fletcher Journal of Human Security 5. 
13 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Liberia (TRC): Volume I: Findings and Determinations (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, 2008) 
55. Parts added subsequently to the report of the Liberian TRC contain references to the ICESCR and an 
appendix with a chapter on ‘economic crimes and the conflict, exploitation and abuse’ but no concrete analysis 
of Liberia’s legal obligations in the realm of ESCR. 
14 L Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’ (2007) 40 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 1, note 59. 
15 On this point, see in particular Z Miller,‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional 
Justice’ (2008) 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice 267. 
16 This has led some authors to imply that ‘legalism’, or the assumptions on ‘laws place as the core framework 
around which transitions from conflict are constructed’ must be abandoned before socio-economic rights can be 
meaningfully addressed in transitional justice. K McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding 
of Transitional Justice’ (2007) 34 Journal of Law and Society 413, 8. 
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potential of relying on the existing international legal framework dealing with socio-economic 
and cultural human rights issues in attempts to tackle the legacies of an abusive past.  
This article will demonstrate concrete ways in which the most well known and most 
widely ratified international treaty specifically addressing ESCR can be employed to increase 
the prospects of remedying ESCR problems after armed conflicts. Based on a discussion of 
the practice of the United Nations (UN) Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR, or ‘the Committee’), this article [start of p.245] explores how the main international 
treaty dedicated to ESCR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR, or ‘the Covenant’), and its supervision procedure can play a meaningful role 
in enhancing the protection of ESCR in the aftermath of conflicts or other situations of 
widespread violence. The analysis pursues two objectives: first, the article provides an 
empirical analysis of how the CESCR has already addressed conflict-related ESCR challenges 
in the State reporting procedure. What redress, if any, does the Committee recommend for 
violations of ESCR occurring in armed conflict or in other situations of massive human rights 
abuses? And how does the body supervising the implementation of the Covenant address the 
protection of the rights to food, housing, water, health, education and other so-called ESCR in 
countries struggling with the legacies of an armed conflict? The second objective is to 
highlight specific ways in which the Committee’s role in supporting and complementing 
efforts of addressing ESCR-related concerns during and after conflicts could be enhanced and 
how stakeholders such as civil society organisations could use the State reporting procedure 
more effectively. 
Based on this analysis, it will become apparent that contemporary human rights law 
allows for potentially useful synergies between efforts to address past and current denials of 
ESCR and post-conflict/transitional justice processes, and that these linkages deserve to be 
explored where the population affected by the conflict believes that conflict-related ESCR 
concerns should be addressed. In particular, we will see how the legal framework of the 
ICESCR and the State reporting procedure before the Committee can be used to give weight 
to local efforts to include ESCR considerations in post-conflict human rights reforms, or to 
obtain support for ongoing local advocacy efforts to implement recommendations already 
made by national mechanisms such as truth commissions or other commissions of inquiry.  
The benefits of clarifying the use of the framework provided by the ICESCR in 
responses to socio-economic and cultural human rights problems resulting from armed 
conflicts are noteworthy. The State reporting procedure before the CESCR is the most 
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prominent mechanism for monitoring the implementation of ESCR internationally. 160 States 
have ratified the treaty and the Committee’s openness to submissions from civil society and 
humanitarian stakeholders makes the State reporting procedure a mechanism whose potential 
for synergies with post-conflict initiatives merits analysis. The Committee can clarify links 
between ESCR and post-conflict considerations and invite State delegations to provide 
information on whether and how the chosen or discussed approaches, including mechanisms 
of transitional justice, could be considered appropriate measures towards the full realisation of 
the Covenant’s rights. In doing so, the Committee can support efforts to ensure that the past is 
effectively addressed, without ignoring the current situation concerning the protection of 
ESCR. 
A more systematic treatment of conflict-related ESCR issues by the Committee would 
also send an important signal to the human rights community, globally and locally, that 
advocating for stronger protection of ESCR in ‘transitional’ contexts [start of p.246] can be 
done with reference to existing international human rights law. Where the Committee has 
made concrete and post-conflict relevant recommendations, they have served to enable civil 
society and technical cooperation partners to invoke them in their own efforts. Moreover, such 
recommendations can also be used as a yardstick to monitor the government’s post-conflict 
policies. This is particularly relevant because the CESCR is a permanent body that can be 
relied on again for follow-up when the State Party presents a subsequent report a few years 
later. 
The potential advantages of the approach suggested in this article are amplified by the 
fact that ‘transitional moments’ often present unique opportunities. The obligations for States 
to progressively realise the rights recognised in the ICESCR and to redress ESCR violations 
gain particular relevance when societies strive to deal with the legacy of a conflict. As in 
Nepal or Guatemala, for instance, a fresh look at policies affecting the protection of ESCR is 
sometimes explicitly included in the official political agenda of the post-conflict 
government.
17
 When examining reports from States affected by a past or ongoing armed 
                                               
17 See for instance the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Nepal (signed 21 November 2006), unofficial 
translation <http://un.org.np/sites/default/files/report/tid_188/2006-11-29-peace_accord-MOFA.pdf> accessed 8 
July 2013, Preamble (referring to the ‘democratic restructuring of the state and social, economic and cultural 
transformation of Nepalese society’). See also Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, ‘Address at the UN General 
Assembly’ (26 September 2008) UN Doc A/63/PV.11, 14-17; or Guatemala’s Agreement on a Firm and Lasting 
Peace (Acuerdo de Paz Firma y Duradera) (signed 29 December 1996) 36 ILM 315, in particular art 6 (‘La paz 
firme y duradera debe cimentarse sobre un desarrollo socioeconómico participativo orientado al bien común 
(…). Dicho desarrollo requiere de justicia social como uno de los pilares de la unidad y solidaridad nacional…’ 
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conflict, the supervisory Committee can often expect that its recommendations will be 
received with much interest.  
Despite its potential, a cautionary note ought to be sounded in respect of the State 
reporting procedure before the CESCR. It is one thing to have the CESCR improve its 
approach to conflict-related concerns and quite another to enhance the availability of redress 
and the protection of ESCR on the ground. The various human rights reporting mechanisms of 
the UN in Geneva rarely change national policies by themselves, and their lack of resources 
and coherence is a serious and well-recognised problem that has led to an ongoing debate 
about their reform.
18
 Moreover, not every State has ratified the Covenant and the Committee 
can only examine the reports of those States that are Parties to the treaty and that actually 
comply with their reporting obligation. States engaged in conflict (and others as well) have 
sometimes failed to submit their reports in a timely manner. While we will see that the 
Committee has increasingly dealt with situations of armed conflict and has started to 
emphasise [start of p.247] that monitoring is particularly relevant in times of crisis,
19
 it must 
be emphasised that the analysis and suggestions made in this article must be supplemented by 
an examination of what other mechanisms are available, in particular where the State is not 
Party to the ICESCR.
20
 
It should also be noted that this article is not concerned with the debate on the 
normative nature of ESCR, or whether ESCR should necessarily be included in the work of 
transitional justice mechanisms or whether they should better be dealt with by other means in 
any given context. Rather, the article starts from the premise that there are situations in which 
national consultations reveal the need and hope of the affected population that ESCR-related 
concerns will be addressed in efforts to support a country’s recovery from armed conflict. 
The State reporting procedure before the CESCR is simply an additional tool at the 
disposal of many stakeholders seeking to enhance redress for past abuses of ESCR and the 
                                                                                                                                                   
(‘Lasting and sustainable peace requires participatory socioeconomic development (…). Such development 
requires social justice as one of the pillars of unity and national solidarity’). 
18 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has recently summarised her reform proposals in N Pillay, 
‘Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System: A Report by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ (OHCHR, 2012). 
<www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/HCReportTBStrengthening.pdf> accessed 8 July 2013. 
19 See for instance CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations: Colombia’ (2010) UN Doc E./C.12/Col/CO/5, para 7, 
and section 3.3 below. 
20 Other avenues include the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council or the use of so-called 
Special Procedures. See further C Golay, C Mahon and I Cismas, ‘The Impact of the UN Special Procedures on 
the Development and Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 15 International Journal 
of Human Rights 299. 
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overall protection of ESCR in post-conflict States. As we shall see, the potential of employing 
this procedure has not yet been maximised. The central suggestion made in this article is, 
therefore, that the reporting procedure should be used more systematically and strategically to 
encourage, question and support authorities to integrate ESCR in the measures they take to 
address the legacies of the armed conflict, or at least to consider all available options 
carefully. 
The article is organised as follows: by way of background, the following section 2 
briefly outlines States’ obligations to work towards the full realisation of the rights recognised 
in the Covenant by ‘all appropriate means’, including by providing domestic forms of redress 
for past violations of ESCR. Section 3 takes stock of how concerns related to armed conflict 
and widespread violence have so far been addressed by the CESCR. Based on this empirical 
analysis, section 4 makes recommendations to the Committee and to other stakeholders. 
2. BACKGROUND: OBLIGATIONS OF POST-CONFLICT STATES 
States affected by armed conflicts are confronted with two relevant types of legal obligations 
pertaining to ESCR. On the one hand, such States often face particularly serious challenges 
concerning the overall realisation of ESCR. Dysfunctional health or educational systems, 
discrimination, poverty and scarce financial or human resources [start of p.248] often 
disproportionately plague societies devastated by armed conflicts. The ICESCR requires all 
States to take steps by all appropriate means to fully realise ESCR. When examining the 
reports from vulnerable States, the CESCR provides advice on how these legal obligations of 
the Covenant could be implemented in the challenging circumstances in which a State 
affected by an armed conflict finds itself. On the other hand, States should provide remedies 
for past violations related to the legacy of the conflict. For instance, where government forces 
displaced people from their homes, it is increasingly recognised that victims have a right to 
benefit from remedies and reparation.
21
 
Two essential considerations indicate that the ICESCR requires States to provide at 
least some forms of redress when violations of ESCR have occurred. First, the ordinary 
meaning of the term ‘all appropriate means’ in the ICESCR indicates that a broad range of 
                                               
21 UNGA Res 60/147 ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ 
(16 December 2005), Preamble. See also D Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2nd edn, 
OUP 2005) 7-10. 
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measures is envisioned.
22
 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR requires states to respect, protect and 
fulfil Covenant rights. The relevant provision of ICESCR broadly refers to ‘legislative and 
other appropriate means’.23 Article 2(1) stipulates: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
24
 
Taking into account resource constraints, the word ‘appropriate’ refers to those feasible 
measures that seem most useful, suitable and promising to the realisation of the rights 
contained in the Covenant. If it is accepted that the provision of remedies is ‘essential to the 
full and non-discriminatory realisation of human rights’,25 then ‘all appropriate means’ 
necessarily also includes at least some redress for violations. Second, the object and purpose 
of the ICESCR as a human rights treaty is to effectively enhance the position of the individual 
to claim his or her [start of p.249] rights.
26
 Providing redress for past abuses ensures ‘that the 
measures taken towards the full realisation of the rights are not purely superficial and 
vacuous’.27 The High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, for instance, explained the relationship 
between the general obligation to realise the rights recognised in the treaty and the provision 
of remedies as follows: 
[S]ince Kenya is a State that is a party to the aforesaid Covenant, the Court must rise 
to the occasion in addressing, recognizing and giving remedies under the Covenant. 
                                               
22 The interpretation of the provisions of the ICESCR has to start with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(adopted on 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 31. 
23 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, art 2(1). 
24 ibid (emphasis added). 
25 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights (adopted 25 June 
1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23, para 27. 
26 As the CESCR stressed in General Comment No 9, the expression ‘appropriate means’ in art 2(1) must 
necessarily cover the provision of redress because of the ‘fundamental requirements of international human 
rights law’. CESCR, ‘General Comment No 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant’, (1998) UN Doc 
E/C.12/1998/24, para 2. 
27 M Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its 
Development (Clarendon Press 1995) 128.  
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(…) The Court should bear in mind that the rights under the Covenant are intended 
to be guaranteed by each party state and effectively redressed whenever infringed.’28 
The ICESCR thus tasks States to take steps that will enhance the protection for victims of 
armed conflict but also the general population within the State’s jurisdiction. But what types 
of measures does the Covenant envisage? States have considerable discretion in the conduct 
they pursue to achieve the full realisation of the rights recognised in international treaties.
29
 
Given the variety of economic, social and legal systems, as well as the different levels of 
development and circumstances of each State, each State Party’s approach to implementing 
the Covenant’s obligations may legitimately vary. But this discretion is not unlimited. The 
Committee understands the ‘broad and flexible approach of Article 2(1)’30 to include the 
provision of judicial or other remedies, where appropriate, as well as administrative, financial, 
educational and social measures.
31
 Other possible ‘appropriate means’ are ‘strategies, policies 
and plans’ as well as the provision of ‘institutions and mechanisms’ capable of ‘effectively 
address[ing] the individual and structural nature of the harm’.32 [start of p.250] 
States must indicate ‘not only the measures that have been taken but also the basis on 
which they are considered to be the most appropriate under the prevailing circumstances’.33  
The Committee has noted that measures should be non-discriminatory,
34
 deliberate, 
concrete, and targeted,
35
 accessible, affordable, timely and effective.
36
 Sepúlveda’s 
observation that the Committee has not developed a test for effectiveness
37
 remains largely 
true. However, the CESCR has emphasised that it considers the consultation and participation 
                                               
28 Republic v Minister for Home Affairs and 2 Others Ex Parte Sitamze, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 
Judgment, 18 April 2008, 16. 
29 Y Iwasawa, ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis’ (1985) 26 
Virginia Journal of International Law 627, 660. 
30 CESCR General Comment No 9 (n 26) para 1. 
31 CESCR, ‘General Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations’ (1990) UN Doc E/1991/23, para 
7. 
32 CESCR, ‘General Comment No 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) UN 
Doc E/C.12/GC/20, para 40. 
33 ibid para 11. 
34 ICESCR (n 23) art 2(2). 
35 General Comment No 3 (n 31) para 2. See also CESCR, ‘Statement on an Evaluation of the Obligation to Take 
Steps to the ‘Maximum of Available Resources’ Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’ (2007) UN Doc 
E/C.12/2007/1, para 8b. 
36 See for instance CESCR, ‘General Comment No 14: The Highest Attainable Standard of Health’ (2000) UN 
Doc E/C.12/2000/4, paras 11, 12, 59. 
37 M Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (Intersentia 2003) 337. 
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of the affected population to be a crucial requirement for effectiveness.
38
 The Committee has 
deemed measures to be ineffective in circumstances where the State did not allocate the 
necessary resources to implement them,
39
 or if the authorities failed to take into account the 
situation of the most disadvantaged members of society.
40
 
To date, the CESCR has made a range of specific recommendations related to armed 
conflicts, which will be outlined and analysed next. We will see that the Committee’s 
approach to ESCR concerns arising from armed conflict remains inconsistent and cursory, yet 
the CESCR has provided indications on how the main instrument in international human 
rights law on ESCR pertains to armed conflict and on the measures States should take in order 
to strengthen the protection of ESCR during or in the aftermath of armed conflict or other 
situations of massive violence. 
3. THE COMMITTEE’S APPROACH TO CONFLICT-RELATED 
ESCR CONCERNS 
The method used to examine the observations the Committee has so far made on armed 
conflict and attempts to deal with the legacies of past abuses is a content analysis of 
concluding observations, i.e. the texts adopted by the Committee following examination of a 
State’s report. A summary of the empirical data can be found in Table 1. In this analysis, the 
concluding observations since the [start of p.251] beginning of the Committee’s adoption of 
such documents have been included,
41
 but it is important to note that conflict-affected States 
often fail to report to UN supervisory bodies, and some have not ratified the ICESCR. Hence, 
the number of relevant concluding observations is limited by the fact that the Committee does 
not always have an opportunity to make recommendations to all States affected by armed 
conflicts.
42
 
                                               
38 CESCR, ‘General Comment No 4: The Right to Adequate Housing’ (1991) UN Doc E/1992/23, para 12. 
39 For a recent example: CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Angola’ (2008) UN Doc E/C.12/Ago/CO/3, para 27 
(displacement). 
40 CESCR Statement (n 35) para 8. 
41 The CESCR adopted its first Concluding Observations in 1993. CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Australia’ 
(1993) UN Doc E/C.12/1993/9. 
42 Note that the CESCR has recently decided to take a bolder approach to the issue of the non-reporting. After 
several reminders and a lack of response from the concerned State, it has reserved the right to review the State’s 
implementation even in the absence of a State report, based on the information available from other stakeholders. 
It did so for the first time in November 2012 in relation to the Republic of Congo (Congo Brazzaville) and 
Equatorial Guinea. See also OHCHR, ‘Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - Working Methods: 
Overview of the Present Working Methods of the Committee’ 
<www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/workingmethods.htm> accessed 8 July 2013.  
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The way in which the Committee has dealt with situations of ongoing or past armed 
conflict in its reporting procedure can roughly be grouped into three phases along a 
continuing spectrum.  
3.1 PHASE I: ARMED CONFLICT AS AN EXCUSE FOR SUB-OPTIMAL OUTCOMES 
In a first phase, the Committee used to merely mention the existence of an armed conflict or 
widespread violence in an introductory section of the concluding observations entitled ‘factors 
and difficulties impeding the implementation of the Covenant’.43 The CESCR rarely analysed 
the consequences of this observation any further. References to armed conflict in this section 
of the concluding observations are worded as an acknowledgement of the difficulties faced by 
the State Party. It appears that the Committee intended them simply as an indication that it 
was aware of the challenges raised by an armed conflict in the State Party. In 1998, for 
instance, the Committee recognised: 
that the prolonged period of violence and conflict that has affected Sri Lanka since 
1983 has hampered the realization of economic, social and cultural rights in the 
country. The conflict has resulted in large-scale internal displacement of people, 
hindered government efforts to provide essential services in the affected areas, and 
diverted resources from social and development objectives.
44
 [start of p.252] 
The first concluding observations on Sri Lanka are typical of the early approach of the 
CESCR to mention the existence of an ongoing or past armed conflict, but not to analyse the 
consequences of this observation any further in any other part of the concluding observations.  
This early approach contrasts with more recent concluding observations. References to 
a conflict as a factor impeding the implementation of the Covenant seem less forthcoming in 
later concluding observations even when the situation could arguably have qualified as an 
armed conflict. When reviewing the periodic report of Kenya in 2008, the Committee 
explicitly noted ‘the absence of any significant factors or difficulties preventing the effective 
implementation of the Covenant in the State Party’.45 The country had been ravaged by armed 
violence following the elections in 2007 and thousands of people had been displaced by 
                                               
43 In this category, I included all concluding observations that indicate that the Committee was concerned about 
an armed conflict or a situation of widespread violence, even where it did not qualify the situation as an armed 
conflict. In other words, I counted concluding observations referring to terms such as ‘social conflict’ or 
‘tensions and political instability’. 
44 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Sri Lanka’ (1998) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.24, para 5. 
45 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Kenya’ (2008) UN Doc E/C.12/Ken/CO/1, para 8. 
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clashes over land, pasture, cattle, and water. Conceivably, the situation could have qualified 
as a non-international armed conflict at the time of the events reviewed by the Committee.
46
 
The establishment of whether or not there are significant factors or difficulties impeding the 
implementation of the treaty is not based on a mechanical analysis, but may also depend on 
whether the Committee intended to give the State some more leeway by acknowledging its 
difficult circumstances, in other words, whether the Committee accepts the existence of an 
armed conflict as an excuse for a sub-optimal situation of ESCR protection. In the concluding 
observations on Kenya, the Committee did take into account the post-election violence,
47
 but 
the violence was not deemed to be a factor impeding the implementation of the Covenant. 
Since the November 2010 session, this introductory section has disappeared from the structure 
of concluding observations altogether.
48
 
Instead, the Committee has, over time, started to analyse conflict-related concerns 
pertaining to ESCR in more depth and in relation to the substantive rights recognised in the 
Covenant. Three substantive areas have particularly gained the Committee’s attention: 
population displacement, mental health, and education. [start of p. 253] 
 
                                               
46 See, for instance, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human rights, ‘Rule of Law in 
Armed Conflict Global Database: Kenya: Applicable International Law’ <www.adh-
geneva.ch/RULAC/applicable_international_law.php?id_state=119> accessed 8 July 2013 (last updated 18 July 
2012). 
47 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Kenya’ (2008) UN Doc E/C.12/Ken/CO/1, para 12. 
48 This evolution makes sense since the obligations of the Covenant are worded flexibly enough to allow a State 
to comply with the requirements of the Covenant even when it is affected by a conflict. The general obligation 
clause of the ICESCR (art 2(1)) refers to the ‘maximum of available resources’. This clause implies that when 
interpreting the substantive rights of the Covenant, the Committee can take into account the fact that a post-
conflict State faces a plethora of competing claims and the level of resources available within the State may be 
lower than it would have been in the absence of an armed conflict.  
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Table 1. References by the CESCR to conflict-related issues in the State reporting procedure 
Year Conflict as a factor or difficulty impeding the 
implementation of the Covenant 
Displacement Mental health Education References to Impunity or 
Transitional Justice 
1993 Lebanon, E/C.12/1993/10, § 8. 
 
Lebanon, E/C.12/1993/10, § 8, 11.    
1995 Philippines, E/C.12/1995/7, § 9. Suriname E/C.12/1995/6, § 21.    
1996 Guatemala, E/C.12/1/Add.3, § 10. Guatemala, E/C.12/1/Add.3, § 20.    
1997 Azerbaijan, E/C.12/1/Add.20, § 12; Iraq, 
E/C.12/1/Add.17, § 7. 
Azerbaijan, E/C.12/1/Add.20, § 12. Iraq, E/C.12/1/Add.17, § 34.   
1998 Sri Lanka, E/C.12/1/Add.24, § 5.     
1999 Bulgaria, E/C.12/1/Add.37, § 8.     
2000 DRC, E/C.12/1/Add.45, § 8, 9; Kyrgyzstan, 
E/C.12/1/Add.49; § 11; Sudan, E/C.12/1/Add.48, 
§ 14, 16. 
 
DRC, E/C.12/1/Add.45, § 9.    
2001 Colombia, E/C.12/1/Add.74 (‘increase of 
violence’), § 8; Croatia, E/C.12/1/Add.73, § 7; 
Senegal, E/C.12/1/Add.62, § 10. 
Colombia, E/C.12/1/Add.74, § 11; Croatia, 
E/C.12/1/Add.73, § 8. 
   
2002 Solomon Islands, E/C.12/1/Add.84, , § 5 
(‘tensions and political instability’) 
    
2003 Guatemala, E/C.12/1/Add.93, § 9.     
2004 Azerbaijan, E/C.12/1/Add.104, § 10-11. Azerbaijan, E/C.12/1/Add.104, § 10-11.    
2005 Serbia and Montenegro, E/C.12/1/Add.108, § 8.  Serbia and Montenegro, 
E/C.12/1/Add.108, § 36,63. 
  
2006 Bosnia and Herzegovina, E/C.12/BIH/CO/1, § 7; 
Tajikistan, E/C.12/TJK/CO/1, § 10. 
FYROM, E/C.12/Mkd/CO/1, § 24, 44; 
Morocco, E/C.12/Mar/CO/3, § 13, 27, 35. 
  Morocco, E/C.12/Mar/CO/3, § 5 
(truth commission). 
2008 Angola, E/C.12/Ago/CO/3, § 7; Nepal, CO 
E/CN.12/Npl/CO/2, § 10; Document submitted by 
UNMIK, E/CN.12/UNK/CO/1, § 8. 
Angola, E/C.12/Ago/CO/3, § 27. Nepal, CO 
E/CN.12/Npl/CO/2, § 25,45. 
Nepal, CO E/CN.12/Npl/CO/2, 
§ 47; Kenya, 
E/C.12/Ken/CO/1, § 34. 
Kenya, E/C.12/Ken/CO/1, § 12 
(impunity and prospective truth 
commission). 
2009 Cyprus, E/C.12/CYP/CO/5, § 8 (‘the continuing 
partition’); Chad, E/C.12/TCD/CO/3, § 7 (‘armed 
uprisings and intercommunal conflicts’); DRC, 
E/C.12/COD/CO/4, § 6; Cambodia, 
E/CN.12/Khm/CO/1, § 11. 
 Cambodia, 
E/CN.12/Khm/CO/1, § 33. 
 Cambodia, E/CN.12/Khm/CO/1, 
§ 24, 31; Chad, 
E/C.12/TCD/CO/3, § 11, 20; 
DRC, E/C.12/COD/CO/4, § 17 
(impunity). 
2010 Afghanistan, E/C.12/Afg/CO/2-4, § 12. Sri Lanka, E/C.12/1/Add.24, § 5,7; 
Afghanistan, E/C.12/Afg/CO/2-4, § 22, 23; 
Colombia, E./C.12/Col/CO/5, § 15, 17, 19, 
21, 24, 26, 27; Algeria, E/C.12/DZA/CO/4, 
§ 19. 
Afghanistan, 
E/C.12/Afg/CO/2-4, § 42; 
Algeria, E/C.12/DZA/CO/4, 
§16. 
Colombia, E./C.12/Col/CO/5, 
§ 26. 
Afghanistan, E/C.12/Afg/CO/2-4, 
§ 15, 31 (impunity); Colombia, 
June 2010, E./C.12/Col/CO/5, § 
12 (impunity, reparations). 
2011  Israel, E/C.12/ISR/CO/3, § 26. Israel, E/C.12/ISR/CO/3, § 
32. 
Russian Fed., 
E/C.12/RUS/CO/5, § 33; 
Israel, E/C.12/ISR/CO/3, § 33. 
 
2012  Ethiopia, E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3, § 22-3  Ethiopia, E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3, 
§ 26. 
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[start of p.255] 
3.2 PHASE II: SOME SCRUTINY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONFLICT-RELATED 
ESCR PROBLEMS  
When the Committee has taken into account a situation of armed conflict, the first and by far 
the most frequently analysed aspect has been population displacement. Undoubtedly, 
displacement affects the realisation of a broad range of ESCR and displaced individuals are 
highly vulnerable.
49
 It is perhaps unsurprising that displacement was the first conflict-related 
issue that appeared in the Committee’s concluding observations.50 Among the numerous 
concluding observations referring to displacements, a few of the most recent examples 
illustrate how the Committee has recommended measures that the State Party should take to 
address conflict-related problems in the realm of ESCR. 
In the document submitted by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, the 
Committee prominently analysed population displacement resulting from the armed conflict. 
The Committee noted that the submission process for immovable property claims was 
problematic given that the short deadline precluded many internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
from submitting their claims to the Kosovo Property Agency.
51
 The Committee also 
mentioned the lead contamination of an IDP camp and examined social security schemes 
from the point of view of conflict-related displacement. It criticised the fact that displaced 
land owners are generally excluded from social security, though they are often effectively 
prevented from using their land, due to security reasons or because their land has been 
occupied by others.
52
  
When examining the report of Nepal in 2008, displacement was also one, albeit not the 
only, focus of the Committee in relation to the armed conflict: the Committee noted that 
property had not been returned to IDPs, contrary to the peace agreement.
53
 The CESCR 
recommended that the State Party should ensure the safe and sustainable return of the 
                                               
49 UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict’ (2007) UN Doc S/2007/643, para 54. 
50 For the earliest instance, see CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Lebanon’ (1993) UN Doc E/C.12/1993/10, 
para 11. 
51 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the document submitted by UNMIK’ (2008) UN Doc 
E/CN.12/Unk/CO/1, para 28.  
52 ibid para 21.  
53 ibid para 14. In para 16, the Committee also notes ‘that the conflict has exacerbated the harsh conditions of 
women living in rural areas, including Tharu women who have found themselves widowed as a result of the 
death or disappearance of their spouses during the conflict’.  
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displaced.
54
 Similarly, the Committee referred extensively to displacement in the concluding 
observations on Kenya, Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia and most recently Sri Lanka and 
Israel. In relation to IDPs, the Committee recommended that Kenya allocate sufficient 
financial assistance to IDPs,
55
 a recommendation that [start of p.256] has previously been 
made to Macedonia and to Cyprus.
56
 The experts encouraged Afghanistan to curb 
unemployment of IDPs and to provide basic social security.
57
 To Algeria, the Committee 
recommended measures to increase the standard of living in rural areas to facilitate the return 
of IDPs.
58
 The CESCR urged Colombia to prevent and protect displaced women and children 
from violence, sexual exploitation and trafficking. The Committee recommended 
strengthening the protection of IDPs by ensuring that displaced children are registered, by 
implementing a national food policy to combat malnutrition, and by providing access to 
adequate housing solutions and reproductive health services.
59
 In 2010, the Committee also 
made forthright recommendations to Sri Lanka. The CESCR urged the authorities to close the 
so-called High Security Zones from which IDPs are prevented from returning to their homes. 
The Committee also tried to persuade the State to improve the conditions of IDPs in general, 
to abstain from hindering those who assist them, and to provide detailed information on the 
situation of IDPs in the next report.
60
 In the most recent concluding observations relevant to 
this analysis, the Committee recommended ‘that [Israel] review and reform its housing policy 
and the issuance of construction permits in East Jerusalem, in order to prevent demolitions 
and forced evictions and ensure the legality of construction in those areas’.61 
The second substantive issue on which the Committee has made specific statements 
tailored to (post-)conflict situations concerns mental health. It did so for the first time in 1997 
when examining the report from Iraq, urging the Iraqi authorities to submit ‘concrete and 
comprehensive information on measures taken or foreseen in order to address the 
                                               
54 ibid para 33. 
55 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Kenya’ (2008) UN Doc E/C.12/Ken/CO/1, para 27. 
56 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (2006) UN Doc 
E/C.12/Mkd/CO/1, para 44. The Committee recommended that destroyed farming goods be replaced and that the 
authorities settle pending compensation claims. The CESCR addressed a similar recommendation to Cyprus: 
CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Cyprus’ (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/Cyp/CO/5, para 12 (access to social 
benefits for displaced women and children). 
57 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Afghanistan’ (2010) UN Doc E/C.12/Afg/CO/2-4, paras 22, 23. 
58 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Algeria’ (2010) UN Doc E/C.12/Dza/CO/4, para 19. 
59 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Colombia’ (2010) UN Doc E./C.12/Col/CO/5, paras 15, 17, 19, 21, 24, 
26. 
60 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Sri Lanka’ (2010) UN Doc E/CN.12/LKA/CO/2-4, paras 29, 33. 
61 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Israel’ (2011) UN Doc E/CN.12/ISR/CO/3, para 26.  
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psychological and emotional problems affecting children after years of armed conflict’.62 In 
the concluding observations on Serbia and Montenegro, the Committee noted that domestic 
violence often resulted from psychological distress caused by unemployment and traumatic 
disorders related to the armed conflict.
63
 More recently, the Committee recommended to 
Nepal and Cambodia that a higher priority be accorded to mental health care in relation to 
persons affected by the [start of p.257] conflict.
64
 In 2010, the Committee also recommended 
that Afghanistan, if necessary, seek international cooperation to address conflict-related 
traumatic disorders.
65
  
The third substantive conflict-related issue invoked by the Committee concerns 
education. Similar to the Committee’s recommendations on the provision of mental health 
care to strengthen implementation of the right to health in countries affected by an ongoing or 
past conflict, the Committee sometimes, but not consistently, made links between the right to 
education and efforts to overcome the legacy of armed conflict or widespread violence. To 
Nepal, the CESCR stressed ‘the value of education as a tool for national reconciliation’ to 
emphasise its recommendation on equal access to free primary education.
66
 Similarly, the 
Committee called upon Sri Lanka to ensure that human rights and peace education be 
included in school curricula.
67
 When reviewing the report of the Russian Federation in 2011, 
the Committee expressed concern that ‘in spite of the information provided by the delegation, 
children living in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus reportedly remain affected in one or 
other way by the prevailing consequences of the ended conflict, in particular with regard to 
their right to education’.68 The experts recommended that the authorities take ‘urgent 
measures to ensure that all children living in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus and those 
internally displaced pursue their schooling (...) to prevent their voluntary recruitment into 
military units’.69 The trend to emphasise conflict-related concerns pertaining to the right to 
education has resulted in a set of very specific recommendations addressed to Israel in 2011: 
the Committee had detailed information at its disposal and made thorough recommendations 
                                               
62 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Iraq’ (1997) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.17, para 34. 
63 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Serbia and Montenegro’ (2005) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.108, para 23. 
64 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Nepal’ (2008) UN Doc E/CN.12/Npl/CO/2, paras 25, 45. CESCR, 
‘Concluding Observations, Cambodia’ (2009) UN Doc E/CN.12/Khm/CO/1, para 33. 
65 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Afghanistan’ (2010) UN Doc E/C.12/Afg/CO/2-4, para 42. 
66 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Nepal’ (2008) UN Doc E/CN.12/Npl/CO/2, para 47. 
67 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Sri Lanka’ (2010) UN Doc E/CN.12/LKA/CO/2-4, paras 29, 33. 
68 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Russian Federation’ (2011) UN Doc E/C.12/RUS/CO/5, para 33. 
69 ibid. 
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about how the higher dropout rate and shortage of classrooms in Arab schools compared to 
Hebrew schools should be addressed despite the unsettled conflict.
70
  
Conversely, the recommendations on education to Afghanistan, Cambodia, or 
Morocco were not linked to the measures taken by the authorities to address the challenges 
related to the armed conflicts, even though there seems to be no substantive reason to suggest 
such a linkage to Nepal, for instance, but not to Cambodia or Morocco, given that all these 
States are engaged in efforts to deal with a violent past, in which discrimination in education 
probably played a role.
71
 [start of p.258] 
3.3 PHASE III: TOWARDS A MORE SUBSTANTIAL AND SYSTEMATIC APPROACH? 
Despite the limited analysis of displacement, mental health and education, there is as yet no 
systematic discussion as to how the Committee frames its recommendations on ESCR-related 
concerns arising from an armed conflict. The approach of the Committee appears inconsistent 
and somewhat unsystematic, but there is evidence of a tentative evolution of the Committee 
towards a more substantial analysis of conflict-related ESCR challenges.  
3.3.1 Closer Scrutiny 
A comparison between two subsequent concluding observations on Colombia illustrates this 
yet uncertain development. In 2001, the Committee cautiously recommended that the State 
‘reduce inequality and put an end to conflict by political negotiation, which is the only way 
effectively to guarantee the ESCR of all citizens’,72 and expressed concern about children 
affected by the conflict.
73
 In its 2010 session, the Committee used much more explicit 
language. Considering that concluding observations are worded very diplomatically, the 
following paragraph indicates that the experts of the Committee were not impressed with the 
State Party’s report:  
                                               
70 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Israel’ (2011) UN Doc E/C.12/ISR/CO/3, para 33. 
71 See, for instance, the statement in the Concluding Observations on Cambodia that children whose first 
language is not Khmer may face discrimination in education. CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Cambodia’ 
(2009) UN Doc E/CN.12/Khm/CO/1, para 34. In the cases of Kenya and Colombia, the Committee did make a 
weak link between the violent situation and education, but only as far as displaced children’s access to education 
was concerned. CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Kenya’ (2008) UN Doc E/C.12/Ken/CO/1, para 34; 
CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Colombia’ (2010) UN Doc E./C.12/Col/CO/5, para 27 (and 26 on the 
negative effect of the use of narcotics which, in the Committee’s view, finance the armed conflict). 
72 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Colombia’ (2001) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.74, para 30. 
73 ibid para 20. 
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The Committee is deeply alarmed about the consequences of the long-standing 
internal armed conflict in the State Party. The Committee regrets the lack of 
sufficiently detailed information regarding the actual implementation by the State 
Party of its obligations under the Covenant, in relation to the civilian populations, in 
the areas affected by the internal armed conflict. The Committee urges the State 
Party to take immediate and effective measures to implement the plans described in 
the report to address the ongoing armed violence. In this regard, the Committee 
requests the State Party, in its next periodic report, to provide detailed information 
on the implementation of its obligations, as required by the Covenant, in relation to 
all economic, social and cultural rights of the civilian populations affected by the 
internal armed conflict. The Committee reminds the State Party that it is precisely in 
situations of crisis, that the Covenant requires the protection and promotion of all 
economic, social and cultural rights, in particular of the most marginalized and 
disadvantaged groups of the society, to the best of its ability under the prevailing 
adverse conditions.
74
 [start of p.259] 
The Committee moreover urged the State Party to address the situation of displaced children, 
women and girls,
75
 and formulated a detailed recommendation on the incorporation of ESCR 
in a national strategy to combat drug-trafficking and corruption – two evils that according to 
the Committee finance all sides of the internal armed conflict.
76
 The openness with which the 
Committee referred to these controversial issues shows that the CESCR will not shy away 
from sensitive issues negatively impacting a State’s implementation of the Covenant.  
3.3.2 Addressing Impunity 
In addition, the Committee has also started to emphasise links between impunity and the 
realisation of ESCR. Table 1 indicates that this is clearly a recent trend. While the CESCR 
regularly insists on the provision of judicial remedies for victims of violations of ESCR,
77
 it 
has so far only very rarely made recommendations to investigate, prosecute and punish 
perpetrators. This is true whether we are concerned with impunity for violations of ESCR,
78
 
                                               
74 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Colombia’ (2010) UN Doc E./C.12/Col/CO/5, para 7. 
75 ibid paras 15, 16. 
76 ibid para 28. 
77 It does this most often by expressing concern about the lack of domestic procedures and/or case-law. See 
CESCR General Comment No 9 (n 26) para 3. 
78 The earliest references on impunity relate to child labour. CESCR, Concluding Observations, Paraguay, 
January 2008, UN Doc E/C.12/Pry/CO/3, para 23(h). 
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or for civil and political rights abuses that indirectly hamper the realisation of ESCR (such as 
the repression of human rights defenders concerned with ESCR).  
However, in the concluding observations on Cambodia of May 2009, the Committee 
framed some of its concerns in terms of requiring enhanced efforts from the State Party to 
fight impunity, especially the ‘repression of repression of human rights activists defending 
[ESCR], particularly those defending housing and land rights’.79 In the analysis of Kenya’s 
report, the Committee for the first time addressed structural inequalities in the enjoyment of 
ESCR in the same paragraph as it addressed impunity and armed violence.
80
 In its November 
2009 session, the Committee moved further in the same direction. In the concluding 
observations on Chad, the Committee recommended that the authorities redouble their efforts 
to fight corruption and impunity based on the Committee’s view that these hinder the 
realisation of ESCR, in particular of women and displaced persons.
81
 The recent moves of the 
Committee towards addressing impunity can also be seen in the concluding observations on 
the DRC in November 2009. Not only was the Committee concerned about impunity in 
relation to several substantive rights of the ICESCR (particularly those of the Pygmies),
82
 but 
[start of p.260] it also observed that ‘impunity for human rights violations and the illegal 
exploitation of the country’s natural resources’ impede the implementation of the Covenant in 
the DRC.
83
 This forms strong evidence that the CESCR considers impunity a serious obstacle 
to the realisation of ESCR – a link that is also increasingly emphasised in the literature on 
economic and social dimensions of post-conflict justice.
84
 Similarly, in its spring 2010 
session, the Committee observed the lack of effective measures to combat widespread 
corruption and impunity in Afghanistan,
85
 and also urged Colombia to firmly combat 
impunity, by investigating all cases, prosecuting and sentencing those responsible, including 
by prosecuting those responsible for child recruitment, trafficking in children, drug-trafficking 
and corruption.
86
 These recent examples seem to support the conclusion that the Committee 
                                               
79 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Cambodia’ (2009) UN Doc E/CN.12/Khm/CO/1, paras 24, 31. 
80 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Kenya’ (2008) UN Doc E/C.12/Ken/CO/1, para 12. 
81 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Chad’ (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/Tcd/CO/3, para 11, 20. 
82 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, DRC’ (2009) UN Doc E/CN.12/COD/4, para 17 (referring to 
extermination, persecution and social marginalization of Pygmies, ‘committed in total impunity’. 
83 ibid para 6. 
84 See in particular, R Carranza, ‘Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and 
Economic Crimes?’ (2008) 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice 310, explaining how impunity in the 
field of ESCR and impunity in the field of civil and political rights mutually reinforce each other. 
85 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Afghanistan’ (2010) UN Doc E/C.12/Afg/CO/2-4, paras 15, 31 (impunity 
for violence against women and girls). 
86 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Colombia’ (2010) UN Doc E./C.12/Col/CO/5, paras 12, 15, 16, 28.  
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places increasing emphasis on the relationship between impunity and the realisation of human 
rights, including ESCR.
87
  
The Committee’s approach in recent concluding observations should be welcomed. 
There is no legal reason why the Committee should not further develop its approach on the 
judicial and non-judicial responses to violations of the Covenant. Investigations and criminal 
proceedings may in some circumstances be a necessary component of ‘appropriate means’ in 
complying with the obligations of States to respect, protect and fulfil the rights recognised in 
the Covenant.
88
  
3.3.3 References to Transitional Justice 
In addition to more assertive and substantial recommendations on conflict-related ESCR-
concerns, the CESCR has also started to show interest in transitional justice mechanisms. The 
first concluding observations in which the Committee referred to the existence of a 
transitional justice mechanism are the concluding observations [start of p.261] regarding 
Morocco in 2006.
89
 A cursory but explicit reference to transitional justice mechanisms was 
also made in the concluding observations on Kenya
90
 and Colombia.
91
 In all three cases, the 
Committee mentioned the existence of such mechanisms in the list of positive aspects or 
refers to them briefly, but did not analyse the mechanisms in detail to assess whether their 
establishment could be considered an appropriate measure towards the full realisation of the 
rights recognised in the Covenant. We will revisit this point in section 4. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Committee has not yet provided very 
systematic guidance to State Parties as to the resolution of conflict-related challenges in the 
protection of economic, social and cultural rights. The experts of the CESCR have tailored 
some of their recommendations to the challenges resulting from armed conflicts and there 
                                               
87 The Human Rights Committee supervising the implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
has referred to impunity in more than 50 concluding observations, in particular when analysing reports from 
countries affected by armed conflict or other widespread violence. 
88 Recommendations to fight impunity for civil and political rights abuses against human rights defenders 
advocating for ESCR will not come as a surprise to States and commentators. In some circumstances, an 
argument could also be made that States have certain obligations to investigate the alleged conduct by virtue of 
international criminal law for those violations of ESCR that amount to international crimes (such as war crimes 
or crimes against humanity). On this point, see E Schmid, ‘War Crimes Related to Violations of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (2011) 71 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 523. E Davidsson, ‘Economic 
Oppression as an International Wrong or as Crime against Humanity’ (2005) 23 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 173. 
89 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Morocco’ (2006) UN Doc E/C.12/Mar/CO/3, para 5, mentioning 
Morocco’s Equity and Reconciliation Commission. 
90 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Kenya’ (2008) UN Doc E/C.12/Ken/CO/1, para 12. 
91 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Colombia’ (2010) UN Doc E./C.12/Col/CO/5, para 12. 
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seems to be an evolution towards paying more attention to issues related to armed conflicts 
and the responses taken to address their legacies.  
This evolution and the increasing openness of the Committee to discuss conflict-
related issues seems unsurprising given the general trend in international law to explore the 
parallel application of human rights law and international humanitarian law.
92
 In addition, 
international human rights law concerning ESCR has significantly developed over the last 
decades, moving beyond the point when it considered ESCR an orphan of human rights law. 
The dichotomy between ESCR and civil and political rights has been eroding in the practice 
of courts, human rights organs, advocacy and in the scholarly literature, and States have 
expressed their commitment to recognise ESCR on the same footing as civil and political 
rights.
93 
Many countries have also entrusted their judiciaries to adjudicate claims based on 
ESCR.
94
 The recognition by States of the interdependence and indivisibility of all human 
rights has certainly played a role in furthering the recognition of the practical relevance of 
people’s access to economic, social and cultural rights for the prevention and mitigation of 
armed conflicts and civil strife. Although this section has revealed lacunae in the Committee’s 
current approach, the Committee is capable of tailoring its recommendations to countries 
dealing with an armed conflict provided that it is equipped with relevant information from 
stakeholders. At the same time, it is too early to conclude whether the evolution in the 
Committee’s approach will be sustained over time. As Table 1 shows, recent [start of p.262] 
concluding observations in 2012 only contained references on the standard of living and 
education of those displaced in Ethiopia.
95
 
Based on the above analysis, we can identify practical steps to strengthen the 
Committee’s approach and the use of the reporting procedure in responses to conflict-related 
challenges in the realm of ESCR. 
                                               
92 The International Court of Justice has repeatedly confirmed that human rights law remains applicable in times 
of armed conflict. It has made an explicit statement on the ICESCR in Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) 2004, ICJ Rep 2004,178 – 191, paras 106-
112. 
93 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (n 25) para 5. 
94 M Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (CUP 
2008). For a useful overview, see also COHRE, 'Leading Cases on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' 
(Working Paper No 7, COHRE 2009). 
95 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Ethiopia’ (2012) UN Doc E/C.12/ETH/CO/1-3, paras 22-3 and 26. 
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4. OPPORTUNITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following suggestions to the Committee as well as to other stakeholders could serve to 
enhance the Committee’s role in addressing the protection of people’s enjoyment of ESCR in 
States affected by armed conflicts or massive violence. 
4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON ESCR 
4.1.1 Asking the Right Questions and Forging Links with Transitional Justice Processes  
The first recommendation to the experts of the CESCR is to engage State delegations in more 
detailed discussions of the conflict-related challenges in the implementation of ESCR and the 
measures taken to address them, including the existence and mandate of existing or potential 
transitional justice mechanisms. Even if the time of the interactive dialogue with State Parties 
is very limited, a broader and more specific list of conflict-related issues would deserve to be 
discussed. 
The CESCR should not only ask questions more frequently and systematically but it 
should also expand the list of conflict-related issues it enquiries about. For instance, while 
mental health is certainly a crucial post-conflict challenge related to ESCR, it is unclear why 
the Committee does not systematically ask questions, for instance, about access to 
rehabilitation more generally.  
How should the Committee identify suitable questions? In order to tailor its questions 
to the situation of the State Party, the Committee could carefully vet the submissions it 
receives from all stakeholders for the most salient conflict-related issues and prepare its list of 
questions accordingly. Inspiration could also come from a consideration of recommendations 
previously made by domestic actors engaged in attempts to deal with the abusive past. For 
instance, in a number of concluding observations, the Committee has discussed issues very 
similar to those examined by a previous transitional justice mechanism. The Commission for 
Historical Clarification in Guatemala, for example, issued its report in 1999 and included 
recommendations on a range of ESCR-related issues, including reparations and land 
restitution, [start of p.263] access to ESCR for indigenous communities and agricultural 
reform.
96
 At the next examination of Guatemala’s report, the Committee could have actively 
engaged with these recommendations, instead of simply taking ‘note of the efforts made by 
                                               
96 Comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, Guatemala: Memoria del silencio (AAAS 1999) 
‘Recomendaciones’ [Guatemala Truth Commission Report – Recommendations]. 
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the State Party towards the implementation of the National Reparation Programme’ and 
issuing a very generically phrased recommendation ‘that the State Party make every possible 
effort (...) to provide adequate follow-up to various issues contained in the Peace Agreements 
of 1996’.97 Had the Committee asked the State Party for additional detail on the ESCR-related 
aspects of the commitments made in the peace agreement, this would in all likelihood have 
been a more fruitful use of the dialogue time between the Guatemalan representatives and the 
CESCR experts. Such an interaction might have resulted in more substantial and tailored 
recommendations in the concluding observations. 
A similar lack of detailed engagement with the ESCR challenges arising from a past 
conflict is apparent in the concluding observations on Algeria. In May 2010, the Committee 
recommended to Algeria to ensure that families of disappeared persons have access to social 
security, including if the family had not obtained a court declaration that the disappeared 
relative had died.
98
 This recommendation concerns one of the main outcomes of the Algerian 
Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission in Charge of the Question of Disappearances. This inquiry 
operated from 2003 to 2005 and led to a controversial reparations plan for the families of the 
disappeared. An obviously problematic aspect of this scheme was that reparations were only 
awarded to those who presented a death certificate, which many families were reluctant to 
obtain without knowing the fate of the disappeared. For many families, this was interpreted as 
an attempt to bribe them to stop asking for information.
99
 
The fact that the Committee did not seem to ask more questions about the past conflict 
and the measures taken to address its consequences is a missed opportunity. Often, there is a 
local constituency lobbying for the implementation of recommendations made by truth 
commissions and commissions of inquiry even years after the completion of those 
mechanisms. Had the Committee been aware of this link, it could have included a more 
detailed analysis in its concluding observations. This in turn would have had the potential to 
support the local advocacy efforts in [start of p.264] Algeria around the issue of the right to 
                                               
97 CESCR, Concluding Observations, Guatemala, December 2003, UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.93, paras 19, 28. 
98 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Algeria’ (2010) UN Doc E/C.12/Dza/CO/4, para 13. 
99 See Algeria, Presidential Decree No 05-278 of 15 August 2005, available at 
<http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Algeria-Charter_Decree05-278.pdf> accessed 
8 July 2013. This decree submitted the reparations plan to a popular referendum. While promising compensation 
and other forms of reparations, the decree emphasises the view that ‘the sovereign people of Algeria opposes any 
allegations that the Algerian State should take any responsibility for a deliberate pattern of enforced 
disappearances’. (Translation by the author. The original reads: ‘Le Peuple algérien souverain rejette toute 
allégation visant à faire endosser par l’Etat la responsabilité d’un phénomène délibéré de disparition.’) 
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social security and the struggle for redress and accountability for the abuses committed in the 
civil conflict.  
Other missed opportunities are the instances in which the Committee noted the 
existence of transitional justice mechanisms, but did not assess whether their establishment or 
implementation could be considered an ‘appropriate measure’ towards the full realisation of 
the rights recognised in the Covenant. In these instances, the Committee could have enquired 
about the measures taken to respond to the conflict-related ESCR problems. 
To illustrate this point, the 2008 concluding observations on Kenya mention the 
planned establishment of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), but the 
Committee did not ask any questions on the mandate of the Commission and whether its 
establishment could help realise the rights of the Covenant.
100
 When the Committee examined 
the report of Kenya,
101
 a debate on the design factors of the truth commission took place in 
Kenya. Domestic stakeholders discussed whether the mandate of the new truth commission 
should include ESCR, and what else should be done to overcome the socioeconomic 
inequalities plaguing the country at least since the electoral violence in 2007 and 2008.
102
  
The Committee could have asked a question to the State Party on the potential of the 
TJRC from the perspective of the Covenant, and it would probably have done so if civil 
society reports had brought the issue to the attention of Committee members. Asking a 
question in the interactive dialogue between the Committee and the State Party would 
possibly have furnished useful information to both, and would have enabled the Committee to 
provide further input and advice in the concluding observations. 
Similarly, in the case of Nepal, there was a strong acknowledgement – reflected in the 
peace agreement – that addressing ESCR related abuses was a crucial aspect of the peace 
process.
103
 The concluding observations on Nepal are, however, silent with regard to options 
for the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.
104
 It is argued that the Committee 
missed an opportunity to engage the State Party in an analysis of the potential of various 
                                               
100 CESCR, ‘List of Issues, Kenya’ (2007) UN Doc E/C.12/KEN/Q/1.  
101 The constructive dialogue took place on 6 and 7 November 2008. 
102 See for instance, Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (‘Waki Commission’), Report (15 
October 2008), available at <www.communication.go.ke/Documents/CIPEV_FINAL_REPORT.pdf> accessed 8 
July 2013, chapter 2; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human 
Rights Account of Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence: Final Report (Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights 2008). 
103 Nepal Peace Agreement (n 17). 
104 CESCR, Concluding Observations, Nepal, January 2008, UN Doc E/CN.12/Npl/CO/2. 
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options regarding the establishment of, for instance, the planned truth commission. The 
Committee also did not discuss any of the features of the Moroccan transitional justice 
mechanism, the Instance Equité et Réconciliation [Equity and Reconciliation Commission] 
(IER), despite the fact that the IER has been one of the few transitional justice mechanisms 
worldwide [start of p.265] that recommended reparations in the field of economic and social 
rights.
105
 While the State Party included the full mandate of the IER in its periodic report,
106
 
the Moroccan authorities also failed to make the link with the Covenant explicit.
107
 It would 
have been interesting for other countries, and potentially very useful for the Moroccan 
authorities, had the Committee examined the IER from the perspective of the Covenant to 
provide additional guidance as to how this mechanism could enhance the protection of ESCR. 
The way the Committee has so far referred to transitional justice mechanisms contrasts 
with the way the Committee approaches national human rights institutions (NHRI). In order 
to provide more substantial recommendations on the use of transitional justice processes to 
strengthen the protection of ESCR, the Committee might want to ask similar questions on the 
measures taken by governments in response to an armed conflict as it does on NHRI. The 
Committee has developed significant jurisprudence on the latter, which are defined as 
administrative bodies set up to protect or monitor human rights.
108
 The CESCR regularly 
requests that States include information on the mandate and activities of NHRI in periodic 
reports, and the Committee devoted a full general comment to the role of NHRI.
109
 Once a 
NHRI has been established, the Committee emphasises the need for these institutions to 
operate transparently and with financial autonomy.
110
 
An analytical study on transitional justice of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) insists that supervisory bodies should give due consideration to the 
subject of ESCR in transitional justice contexts and should encourage national actors to 
                                               
105 International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘Truth and Reconciliation in Morocco’, Annual Report (ICTJ 
2009). N Roth-Arriaza and K Orlovsky, ‘A Complementary Relationship: Reparations and Development’ in P de 
Greiff and others (eds), Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections (Social Science Research 
Council 2009) 184, 91-92.  
106 CESCR, ‘State Report of Morocco to the CESCR’ (2005) UN Doc E/1994/104/Add.29, paras 7-12. 
107 ibid. 
108 See ECOSOC, ‘Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Implementation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) UN Doc E/2009/90, paras 27-70. 
109 CESCR, ‘General Comment No 10: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Protection of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) UN Doc E/C.12/1998/25, para 4; CESCR, ‘Concluding 
Observations, Tunisia’ (1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1/Add.36, paras 20, 28. 
110 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Nepal’ (2008) UN Doc E/CN.12/Npl/CO/2, para 12. 
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ensure that these rights are realised in post-conflict States.
111
 Vice versa, when examining a 
NHRI in a transitioning State, the Committee might also consider emphasising or encouraging 
the role of the NHRI in the context of post-conflict justice. The OHCHR prepared a guidance 
note on NHRI and transitional justice in which it encouraged NHRI to consider dealing with 
ESCR in transitional justice situations.
112
 This guidance note usefully lists possible activities 
for NHRI in relation to transitional justice and provides country experiences for each type of 
[start of p.266] activity. For instance, OHCHR encourages NHRI to ‘consider advocating that 
truth commissions address violations of these rights in their recommendations’.113 Further, the 
guidance note urges NHRI to promote steps to address systematic discrimination and 
inequality that may have caused or exacerbated the past conflict.
114
 It is suggested that the 
Committee take this guidance note into account and encourage State Parties to entrust their 
NHRI with the suggested activities related to the protection and promotion of ESCR in post-
conflict environments.  
4.1.2 A Day of General Discussion on the Implementation of State Obligations in 
‘Transitional Situations’ 
Second, the Committee could also consider holding a so-called ‘day of general discussion’ on 
ESCR challenges resulting from armed conflicts. The CESCR regularly organises such days 
inviting a wide range of stakeholders. Days of general discussion are public meetings in 
which all interested stakeholders are welcome to take part. Usually, the Committee uses such 
days of general discussion as an opportunity to advance its formulation of a prospective 
general comment. The Committee might consider it worthwhile to organise such a day of 
general discussion in order to discuss whether a general comment on the implementation of 
State obligations in transitional situations would be useful. A day of general discussion could 
be used to foster a deeper understanding of the content and implications of article 2(1) of the 
Covenant in relation to recurring ESCR challenges in the aftermath of widespread violence or 
armed conflict. 
If the Committee were to decide that a general comment should be adopted, the 
purpose of such a general comment on transitional situations would not be to convey the 
impression that the level of obligations under the Covenant is attenuated for States dealing 
                                               
111 OHCHR, 'Analytical Study on Human Rights and Transitional Justice '(6 August 2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/18 paras 59-65. 
112 OHCHR, 'Guidance Note on NHRI and Transitional Justice '(27 September 2008) para 6. 
113 ibid paras 33, 36, 41. 
114 ibid. 
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with the legacies of a past armed conflict.
115
 Rather, the motivation for a general comment 
would be to provide assistance and clarification to States Parties with regard to treaty 
provisions and to assist States in implementing them and reporting adequately on the extent to 
which the protection of rights recognised in the Covenant is effective in practice. The CESCR 
could outline common ESCR challenges found in ‘transitioning’ States, such as displacement, 
access to housing, land and property, health and rehabilitation (including mental health), or 
the importance of education and the general obligation of non-discrimination.  
While a very small minority of States still consider it controversial for human rights 
supervisory bodies to make any statements about armed conflicts because they [start of p.267] 
believe that human rights law is inapplicable during times of armed conflict,
116
 there are no 
legal reasons why the Committee should not tailor its recommendations to a particular post-
conflict situation so that the prospects for the full realisation of ESCR can be enhanced as 
effectively as possible. If the Committee was of the view that statements on armed conflicts 
would entangle it in the legal complexities of the parallel application of international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law in times of armed conflict, the CESCR has the 
option to limit the general comment to address post-conflict situations where the applicability 
of human rights law is beyond the slightest doubt. 
In addition to the members of the CESCR, other actors also have a role to play in 
using the State reporting procedure before the UN Committee more effectively. 
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 
Civil society and other stakeholders (such as donors, humanitarian agencies or development 
cooperation partners) could undertake the following recommendations. 
4.2.1 Sending the Right Information 
In advance of an interactive dialogue, many Committee members openly welcome 
suggestions about what questions should be asked to a State Party.
117
 The type of questions 
                                               
115 States have the same general obligations to respect, protect and fulfil ESCR, whether or not they are dealing 
with the legacies of an armed conflict. Other States arguably also face challenges in implementing ESCR, even if 
they are not suffering from an armed conflict. 
116 Among the State Parties to the ICESCR, Israel is most prominently associated with this view and has – 
unsuccessfully – defended this position before the International Court of Justice. See Advisory Opinion Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (n 92) paras 106-112. 
117 The human rights supervisory bodies of the United Nations have a reputation for working closely with civil 
society stakeholders. See in particular E Riedel, ‘The Development of International Law: Alternatives to Treaty-
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posed by the experts in turn influence the substance of the interactive dialogue and the 
ensuing concluding observations. Quite naturally, there seems to be a tendency for Committee 
members to focus on those topics for which they either have personal expertise or solid and 
well-prepared information at their disposal.
118
 What Dankwa and Flintermann pointed out in 
1987 is particularly relevant for the examination of the reports from volatile post-conflict 
countries: ‘The magnitude and importance of the responsibility of supervising the Covenant's 
implementation cannot be overstated. But the task of the Committee will be made easier if it 
draws on the rich store of experience of institutions that have been involved in the promotion 
and protection [start of p.268] of human rights.’119 In other words, much depends on whether 
the Committee is supplied with relevant information about conflict-related ESCR issues and 
whether individual Committee members can be convinced that these issues are particularly 
important.  
For instance, the fact that the Committee discussed the issue of mental health with 
conflict affected States Parties is the result of a (former) Committee member asking specific 
questions to the State delegations presenting the reports of their countries. The inclusion of 
this particular issue in its concluding observations seems to arise from a personal exchange 
between an expert and a stakeholder on mental health, with the stakeholder apparently 
convincing the Committee that the issue of mental health was particularly salient in the 
country to be reviewed.
120
 This openness to persuasion and information provided by 
stakeholders shows that when members of the Committee are convinced that a ESCR issue is 
particularly significant in (post-)conflict situations, the Committee is likely to engage the 
concerned State Party in a dialogue and to include the issue in its analysis. 
To illustrate this point, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) provides an example of the type 
of engagement that this article hopes to strengthen.
121
 In 2006, the CESCR – apparently based 
upon information provided by civil society – encouraged BiH to modify in its domestic laws 
the definition of disability so that inequalities resulting from the diverging availability of 
                                                                                                                                                   
Making? International Organizations and Non-State Actors’ in R Wolfrum and V Röben (eds), Developments of 
International Law in Treaty Making (Springer 2006). A Clapham, ‘The Use of International Human Rights Law 
by Civil Society Organizations’ (2012) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033259> accessed 
8 July  2013. 
118 Conversation with Prof. Eibe Riedel (former member of the CESCR), September 2009. 
119 V Dankwa and C Flinterman, ‘Commentary by the Rapporteurs on the Nature and Scope of States Parties’ 
Obligations’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 136, 137. 
120 Conversation with Prof. Eibe Riedel (former member of the CESCR), September 2009. 
121 I thank Laure-Anne Courdesse, OHCHR, for bringing this development to my attention in October 2010 at 
the OHCHR Expert Workshop on Experiences of Transitional Justice Processes in Dealing with Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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funds in the cantons could be eliminated.
122
 BiH subsequently adopted the proposed Law on 
Amendments to the Law on Social Protection, Civilian War Victims, and Families with 
Children.
123
 Broader categories of beneficiaries were not entitled to social protection. A few 
years later, in June 2010, BiH started to prepare for the next examination of its State report 
before the CESCR. The interactive dialogue with the Committee will probably take place in 
November 2013. At the time of writing, the written report of BiH was already publicly 
available. In this report, the Government explains the measures it took to implement the 
Committee’s recommendation from the concluding observations of 2006.124 Civil society and 
other stakeholders can now provide the Committee with their own assessment of the measures 
taken by the authorities. If the Committee deems it appropriate, it may provide further 
guidance to the State [start of p.269] Party on how to improve the realisation of ESCR in this 
post-conflict situation. This example illustrates potential avenues for using the reporting 
procedure to strengthen the protection of ESCR in the aftermath of conflicts. At the same 
time, this example also illustrates that if and whether the Committee mentions conflict-related 
issues depends on what information the Committee has at its disposal. Stakeholders wishing 
to have an impact on the topics discussed in the dialogue between the State Party and the 
Committee have to submit information well in advance of the relevant session. This limitation 
applies independently of whether or not the State Party is a post-conflict State, but given that 
post-conflict environments are often very volatile, the time lag between the submission of 
information and the examination of the State’s report can be considerably inconvenient. 
Stakeholders therefore need to make an additional effort to plan ahead to ensure that 
Committee members are aware of relevant topics as early as possible and are persuaded as to 
their relevance. 
4.2.2 Capacity-Building 
It would also be helpful to consider building the capacity of Committee members and 
OHCHR staff to systematically explore further the synergies between the State reporting 
procedure and efforts to address ESCR-related problems in post-conflict States. Staff 
members of the OHCHR play an important role in supporting the CESCR and in filtering the 
information, preparing meetings and materials related to upcoming sessions of the CESCR 
                                               
122 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations, Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2006) UN Doc E/C.12/Bih/CO/1,, para 40. 
123 Official Gazette of the Federation of BiH, No 39/06. For a critical assessment, see L Popic and B Panjeta, 
Compensation, Transitional Justice and Conditional International Credit in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sabah 
Print 2010). 
124 ECOSOC, ‘State Report, Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2010) UN Doc E/C.12/BIH/2. 
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and other UN human rights bodies. Governments willing to contribute to the post-conflict 
work of the OHCHR might consider funding initiatives that would build knowledge and 
capacity on post-conflict issues among Committee members and the OHCHR staff working 
within the Human Rights Treaties Branch, for instance by producing and disseminating a 
handbook on transitional justice, post-conflict reconstruction and ESCR or by funding 
additional staff capacities. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Employing the reporting procedure of the main international human rights treaty on ESCR in 
(post-)conflict contexts will obviously not solve all the problems that plague societies 
struggling to address widespread socio-economic and cultural human rights problems. But 
those hoping to increase attention to economic, social or cultural matters in attempts to deal 
with the consequences of armed conflicts have not yet maximised the potential of the legal 
framework provided by the main international treaty dedicated to ESCR. The analysis has 
revealed that the ICESCR, as part of the International Bill of Rights, can be used 
meaningfully to support efforts to enhance the protection of ESCR at the national level. When 
States submit their reports to the supervisory CESCR, the experts can advise vulnerable 
conflict and post-conflict States on specific ESCR challenges related to armed conflicts, such 
as displacement, [start of p. 270] access to health care and rehabilitation, education or 
discrimination exacerbated by the conflict. If used strategically by stakeholders, observations 
from UN bodies can carry significant weight internationally and at the domestic level. Over 
the last few decades, the Committee has already provided some guidance on the provision of 
redress for violations of ESCR. It has, notably, made clear that States Parties must justify why 
they consider the measures taken as the most appropriate under the prevailing circumstances. 
At the same time, the Committee’s approach to armed conflicts and the measures 
taken to recover from conflicts is, as yet, cursory and inconsistent. The article recommends 
that the Committee ought to raise more questions to State delegations as to whether or not the 
measures to deal with the ESCR-challenges resulting from a conflict can be considered 
‘appropriate means’ in the sense of Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. The CESCR should also 
analyse existing or planned mechanisms of transitional justice, such as truth commissions or 
reparations programmes, to analyse the pros and cons of engaging these mechanisms in 
attempts to strengthen the protection and realisation of ESCR. Civil society and other 
stakeholders can encourage the Committee to take a more conflict-sensitive approach if they 
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supply the CESCR with specific and timely information on the links between the realisation 
of ESCR and specific conflict-related challenges. Lastly, building the capacity of Committee 
members and of OHCHR support staff in relation to transitional justice mechanisms would 
enhance the chances that the synergies between the work of the CESCR and transitional 
justice could be maximised. 
The literature on responses to armed conflicts has long suggested that redress for 
massive human rights violations is not possible in courts alone, and that large-scale remedial 
programmes and combinations of measures and mechanisms are required,
125
 just as the 
flexible provisions of the ICESCR accommodate. Prioritising what past abuses and ongoing 
human rights problems should be addressed, and in what ways, is inherently challenging in 
any post-conflict situation. But where national consultations reveal the need to address ESCR, 
the experts of the UN Committee monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR have 
provided at least some guidance. In particular, the Committee has made clear that an ongoing 
or past armed conflict does not excuse the State Party from the obligation to take concerted 
steps to identify and adopt all appropriate means with a view to realising the rights recognised 
in the ICESCR, including by providing redress for conflict-related harm.  
 
 
 
                                               
125 See notably M Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Beacon 1998); and R Falk, ‘International Law, 
and Global Justice: A New Frontier’ in P de Greiff (ed), The Handbook of Reparations (OUP 2006). 
